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Abstract 
The aim of this study was to explore how human factors were taken into account in the 
development of a new type of drilling equipment. This study is part of a larger project on the 
understanding of human factors in the design and implementation of automated drilling 
technology. The principal study was a longitudinal study lasting 4 years that involved 43 
interviews, offshore and onshore observations, and 2 surveys. 
Method 
The analysis in this paper is based on 7 informants who were either part of the design 
team or the paramount project team developing new automated drilling technology for an 
offshore oil- and gas-producing installation in the same development project, in addition to 
project documents. The informants were interviewed using semi-structured interviews, and 
grounded theory based on the coding process of Corbin and Strauss (1990) was used to 
analyse the data.  
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Results 
The core category was found to be insufficient human factor analyses performed in the 
development phase due to the two main categories, namely 1) insufficient information 
coordination and 2) narrow focus in different phases of the project. This was found to 
contribute to increased costs, low user friendliness, and end users’ insufficient knowledge of 
safe usage and potential risks.  
Conclusion  
Our conclusion was that homogenous top competence involving technical aspects 
contributed to developers’ lack of understanding of the need for sufficient analyses of end 
user requirements and of the tasks that would be affected by the new technology. Hence, we 
argue that technological development could benefit from including human factors experts 
from the project’s outset to bridge the gap between the lack of relevant information and 
sufficient information on which to base development decisions. In addition, we contend that 
performing human factors analyses throughout the development of a project would be 
beneficial due to the potential of hindering cultural aspects such as a non-questioning culture, 
which is viewed as a hazard in high-risk organizations. 
 
Keywords: human factors, human reliability, automated technology, safety, petroleum 
industry, technology development 
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1.0 Introduction 
The offshore oil and gas industry is considered a high-risk industry where minor 
incidents can lead to major accidents; thus, safety is a main priority (Årstad et al., 2010). 
Consequences of non-successful development and implementation of new technology have 
the potential of resulting in unwanted incidents and, in worst-case scenarios, major accidents. 
Because studies from the nuclear industry show that between 20 and 50% of incidents involve 
design mistakes (Taylor, 2007), it is important to involve strategies that ensure safety in 
technological development projects. Traditionally, the focus on safety in the development of 
new technology has been on technical aspects. Although lately there has been a growing focus 
on the human end users of the technology (ISO 11064, 2000; NORSOK, 2004; Petroleum 
Safety Authority [PSA], 2011), significant variations still exist in the actual use of human-
centred design standards when developing new technology (Aas & Skramstad, 2010).  
Sætren and Laumann (2015a) conducted a study where they found that too much trust 
contributed to a non-questioning culture on an offshore oil and gas installation and that this 
non-questioning behaviour resulted in technology acceptance. Moreover, the non-questioning 
culture was found to be a potential safety hazard because the end users insufficiently 
questioned the change process, and this was, at least to some extent, the cause of a serious 
unwanted incident on the platform. Hence, we found it interesting to investigate further some 
of the aspects of the trust the end users mentioned during the implementation phase and after 
the technology was in use. In their article, Sætren and Laumann (2015a) pointed out that one 
of the reasons the crew trusted the new technology to such a degree was that they had a 
general trust in the management. Furthermore, prior to the actual implementation, the crew 
members emphasized that they were properly trained and informed about the technological 
change to come because those who developed the technology understood the level of 
competence the crew held and their everyday work. In this paper, we therefore want to 
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explore to what degree those who developed the technology knew the end users for whom 
they were developing the technology. Thus, we explored the process of developing 
technology, which automated parts that were previously handled manually by end users. 
Particulars about the technology and work routines are confidential because they could 
potentially reveal informants’ identities and hence are not described in detail.  
The purpose of the study was to investigate the safety aspects of the work processes 
and the outcome of the development process. The specific research question based on this 
purpose is: How is safety through human factors and human reliability analyses ensured 
during a development process of automated technology in a high-risk industry? 
1.1 Safety in Complex High-Risk Systems 
Several theoretical perspectives assess safety in high-risk systems. Reason (1990) 
distinguishes between active and latent failure, where active failures are errors where the 
consequences are immediately visible. They typically occur due to operator error, and there 
often is a clear relationship between cause and effect. Latent failures, on the other hand, refer 
to decisions and actions taken by those removed from the direct control interface but who still 
affect the outcome. These decisions and actions could be taken long before the occurrence of 
an unwanted incident and thus are unknown latent conditions. This concept is illustrated by 
Reason’s (1990; 1997) Swiss cheese model, where latent conditions in combination with 
active failures could lead to a breach in the defence in depth and result in an accident.  
Furthermore, active failures tend to refer to what Reason (1990) calls human error. 
Human error describes situations where human mental or physical actions do not lead to the 
planned outcome, and this theory investigates which human errors exist and why humans err. 
It is based mainly on human cognition, that is, how people store, select, and recall knowledge. 
Errors are categorized as intended and unintended. Slips and lapses are related to unintended 
actions and connected to how actions are performed as well as the attention given to the task. 
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Mistakes are related to intended actions and connected to how problems are solved. 
Additionally, Reason (1990) mentions violations, which he refers to as deliberate deviation 
from procedure that is not necessarily reprehensible if they do not involve an intention to 
damage the system. Such unintentional actions could still lead to major accidents, as noted by 
Rasmussen (1997). His theory shows how everyday normal behaviour could become 
disastrous because actions could lead to a migration towards the boundaries of acceptable 
safety practice. Thus, the interaction of the effects of decisions made by actors in their normal 
work context must be considered. Decisions are not made in isolation but in a complex social 
context where interactions and interrelationships can produce outcomes that might be difficult 
to predict. In this way, failure can be a result of normal behaviour influenced by, for instance, 
the competing goals of safety and production (Rasmussen, 1997).  
Another theory that assesses safety in high-risk organizations is high reliability 
organizations (HRO) by Weick and Sutcliffe (2015). This theory is related to organizations 
that operate in high-risk environments but experience considerably fewer accidents than 
expected compared to the degree of risk in which they are operating. The authors argue that 
continuous mindful organizational practices can prevent major accidents and promote safety. 
The five distinct practices are 1) preoccupation with failure, 2) reluctance to simplify, 3) 
sensitivity to operations, 4) commitment to resilience, and 5) deference to expertize. These 
five mindful techniques form a collective cognitive infrastructure within a system, which 
enables the system to manage the unexpected and prevent disastrous occurrences (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2015). 
1.2 Human Factors and Human Reliability in Technology Development 
Methods to expand the understanding of the integration between human and machine 
are becoming increasingly important. During the last decades, the number and complexity of 
large and complex technical installations, such as those for petroleum, aviation, and nuclear 
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industries, have increased (e.g. Stamnes, Zhou, Kaasa, & Aamo, 2008; Strøm, 2008; Wilpert, 
2005; Wolfe, Morris, & Baule, 2009). With the growth of complex installations, the 
possibility of dangerous consequences for humans and the environment also are increasing. 
Results from analyses of major accidents and research of on system safety engineering show 
that human actions most likely play a role in triggering these accidents (e.g., Albrechsten & 
Weltzien, 2013; Baker et al., 2007; Demichela, Pirani & Leva, 2014; Taylor, 2013.  For 
instance, reports regarding some of the most serious blowout accidents in petroleum such as 
Piper Alpha, and Macondo, have shown that triggering causes include the little understood 
interaction of factors in various system levels, such as technical, human, social, 
organizational, managerial, and environmental (Cullen, 1993; Graham et al., 2011; Paté-
Cornell, 1993; Rasmussen, 1997; Reason, 1990, 1997; Turner, 1978; Wilpert, 2005). 
Consequently, it is important to minimize such aspects by, for instance, searching for 
adequate design solutions under conditions of distributed decision making where different 
competencies and disciplinary approaches are brought together in settings of cooperative 
work (Rasmussen, 1991). This could be done by involving human factors specialists to 
minimize a mismatch of the developer’s and the user’s conceptual model of the technology to 
be used (Salvendy, 2006; Stanton, Salmon, Walker, Baber, & Jenkins, 2013; Wickens, Lee, 
Liu, & Becker, 2004).  
One view of human factors is that they are concerned with the design of novel systems 
in areas such as usability and safety. Human reliability, on the other hand, focuses more on 
verifying the safe performance of human actions in interactions with the system (Boring, 
2007). However, this segregation of the two fields may not be accurate: the lines between 
them are blurred, as human reliability often is integrated into human factors (Boring & Bye, 
2009; Boring et al., 2009; Gordon, 1996); human reliability analyses usually include task 
  7 
 
analysis, human error identification, and suggestions for human error reduction (Kirwan & 
Ainsworth, 1992; Shorrock & Kirwan, 2002).  
1.3 Human Factors Challenges in Offshore Drilling 
In drilling and well operations, operational tasks are becoming increasingly complex 
and thus have a high risk potential (PSA, 2004; van de Merwe, Øie, & Gould, 2012). In 
addition, operations in mature reservoirs are increasing, which makes operations more 
demanding (PSA, 2004). Technological development therefore is inherently complex because 
it must consider drilling in mature fields, allow drilling for oil in previously undrillable 
targets, and pay attention to the end users for safe operations. It is not sufficient to consider 
only the technological solutions, as the human and organizational factors also are important in 
technological development projects in the offshore context. Qualitative human factors 
analyses has been used, but mainly in relation to engineering design and verification of 
control systems and control rooms (Aas & Skramstad, 2010; Gould, Ringstad, & van de 
Merwe, 2012).  
Human factors challenges exist in drilling and well operations. These include lack of 
active management, training and competence; fluctuations in activity level; insufficient 
communication (Jærnes et al., 2005); task complexity (Jærnes et al., 2005; Rasmussen, 
Standal, & Laumann, 2015); and interorganizational cooperation (Jærnes et al, 2005; Milch & 
Laumann, 2016). To manage such challenges, a holistic approach seems important. This 
involves, for example, consulting end users and human factors specialists during the 
modification and installation of technological equipment (Jærnes et al., 2005; PSA, 2011). A 
lack of connection between technology and psychology has the potential to result in human 
error (Reason, 1990) because flawed comprehension of how to use the technology is likely to 
end in user error (Sheridan, 2008). Thus, it is recommended to adhere to several principles 
regarding human performance when developing technology in the oil and gas sector 
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(McLeod, 2015; PSA, 2011). Examples of such principles are allowing for human variability, 
providing information in a way that is compatible with how the human brain represents and 
thinks about the world, and ensuring that the status of equipment is visible where and when a 
user is likely to interact with it (McLeod, 2015; Norman, 2013). The Petroleum Safety 
Authority regards human and organizational factors as so important that it has declared that 
attention must be paid to them. Furthermore, the International Association of Oil and Gas 
Producers mentions that training and human factors, which form one of four areas under the 
category of prevention and improving well safety, are to be prioritized after the Macondo 
accident (OGP, 2013). Hence, interactions of human and organization must be optimized with 
the technical solutions (PSA, 2011).  
1.4 Human Factors Methods 
Using human factors analyses, such as function, task, and job analyses, is a way to 
make equipment user friendly by providing for human reliability (Jernæs et al., 2005; 
McLeod, 2015; NORSOK, 2004; PSA, 2011). Human factors research is a scientific field that 
consists of a combination of disciplines, including engineering, psychology, and computer 
science (Salvendy, 2006). The objectives of human factors analyses are to maximize human 
and system efficiency (Czaia & Nair, 2006), health (Zimolong & Elke, 2006), safety, 
(Palanque, Koorneef, Johnson, Szwillus, & Wright, 2004), team effectiveness (Salas, Wilson, 
Priest, & Guthrie, 2006) and cost efficiency (Rouse & Boff, 2006). To be able to reach these 
goals, human factors analyses provides several methods of analyses, such as user analysis 
(Wickens et al., 2004), task analysis (Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992), interface analysis, human 
error identification analysis (Stanton et al., 2013), training analysis (Salas et al., 2006), and 
cognitive workload assessment (Ham & Yoon, 2001; Longo, 2015).  
A user analysis is a method where the end users of a product are analysed so the 
designers have the best possibility to design optimal products based on the end users 
  9 
 
(Wickens et al., 2004). In a task analysis, the tasks described include both the physical tasks 
and the cognitive tasks required in the analysed operation as well as any process that identifies 
and examines the tasks performed by the user who interacts with a given system (Kirwan & 
Ainsworth, 1992). Interface analysis methods are used to assess the human–machine interface 
of a particular system and are important to apply in both the design and operational stages of a 
product’s lifecycle to ensure optimal interface design (Stanton et al., 2013). Human error 
identification is a method used to describe potential errors and consequences that might occur 
as well as recovery potential, probability, and criticality. Additionally, the method offers 
associated design remedies or human error reduction strategies (Shorrock & Kirwan, 2002; 
Stanton et al., 2013). Training analysis allows training designers to understand aspects such 
as what needs to be trained, who need to be trained, and where training is needed (Salas et al., 
2006). Cognitive workload assessment consider the mental work necessary to complete a 
given task during a given period (Ham & Yoon, 2001; Longo, 2015). 
1.5 Human-Centred Design Processes 
Human-centred design emphasizes active and systematic participation by users and 
stakeholders in the process of designing new technology (Pascal, Thomas, & Romme, 2013). 
However, difficulties arise from the conflicts between technology-driven demands and the 
integration of human factors, such as the cognitive and action capacities, limitations, and 
needs of the human operator (Wilpert, 2005). One way of dealing with this is to use an 
integrated approach in the development of new technology. An integrated approach involves a 
human scientist, in this case a human factors specialist, as a full member of the design team 
from the beginning of the project, who, hence, has the opportunity to analyse requirements of 
the system (Jærnes et al., 2005). This could improve accident prevention, health, and comfort, 
and various ISO standards may be considered (e.g., ISO 11064, 2000; ISO 6385, 2004). For 
example, the ISO 11064-1 (2000) is part of an international standard developed for designing 
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control centres based on human-centred design. The standard concerns optimal design 
processes and covers all types of control centres, including process industries, transportation 
and logistics, and people deployment services. As the ISO 11064-1 is rather general, it can be 
applicable for a broader spectrum of system design processes. The standard focuses on 
elements such as human-centred design, integrating ergonomics in engineering practice, user 
participation, error-tolerant design, feedback design, and task analysis in every step of the 
process. The ISO 11064-1 (2000) uses ISO 6385 (2004) as a normative reference, which 
establishes fundamental principles of ergonomics and human factors as basic guidelines for 
the design of work systems in general. One of the main purposes of the ISO 6385 is to involve 
human factors in the design to achieve a balance between the human, social, and technical 
requirements. The standard emphasizes that ergonomics should be integrated with other 
aspects of the design.  
1.6 Change Management Theories 
The development of new automated drilling technology brings change to the everyday 
work practices for the end users. In addition, a large-scale technological development project 
requires an optimal development and implementation process as well as change management. 
Most change management theories consist of a recipe for making a transition from the present 
situation to a future desired situation. For instance, Kotter (1996) outlines an eight-step 
program for implementing change, Kanter, Stein, and Jick (1992) offer 10 steps for executing 
change, and Luecke (2003) provides seven steps for a successful transformation. Elements 
such as creating a vision; supporting a strong leader; institutionalizing success through formal 
policies, systems, and structures; focusing on results; and institutionalizing the change are 
common to these change management theories. Further, a common factor seems to be that 
change management theories are leader centric and preoccupied mostly with making the 
change recipients willing to change, and resistance to change is often viewed as something 
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that must be overcome (e.g., Armenakis & Harris, 2009; Cummings & Worley, 2015; Furst & 
Cable, 2008; Ghoshal, 2005; Kanter et al., 1992; Kotter, 1996; Sætren & Laumann, 2015b). 
However, whether theories promoting agreement and the prevention of resistance are optimal 
for changes in high-risk industries is questionable.  
In the sections that follow, we explain the qualitative approach utilized for this study 
as well as the results. Further, we provide a general discussion prior to the presentation of our 
conclusions.  
2.0 Method 
We selected a qualitative approach for this study because we wanted deeper insight 
into the processes of developing new technology, specifically regarding the understanding of 
the end users by those developing the technology. Moreover, we did not identify predefined 
categories prior to the study. Grounded theory is designed to find categories and concepts, and 
this method helps researchers explore the connections between the categories and concepts in 
the process of building a theory. Grounded theory is a method of analysis where the aim is to 
build a theory grounded on the data collected, hence the name (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). 
The results of the current study are based on seven semi-structured individual 
interviews with seven informants in addition to project documents. This study is part of a 
larger project on the understanding of human factors in designing and implementing 
automated drilling technology. In the larger project, 43 interviews were conducted over a 
period of 4 years, and offshore and onshore participatory observations and two surveys were 
completed in the larger project. The seven interviews for this study were the last part of the 
longitudinal study, and were thus the last to be conducted. 
2.1 Participants 
For this study, 7 informants were chosen because of their relevance. The informants 
were part of a project that developed new automatic drilling technology for the offshore 
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petroleum industry. In this development project, the informants were part of the project team 
or the engineer developer team. Further, the informants represented three companies that 
cooperated, among others, on this specific development, namely the customer, the main 
contractor, and the main subcontractor (see Figure 1). The informants were selected based on 
their involvement in the development process of the technology, and more than one person 
was chosen from each of the three companies. Because the development of the technology 
occurred some time before the interviews were conducted, the informants were further chosen 
based on their current work, which was either a continuance of this project or similar projects. 
The interaction complexity and its implications are described in greater depth in the context 
section in the results. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
2.2 Interviews 
The seven interviews were conducted over two months and were based on either 
telephone or video conferences, according to the preferences of the informants. They lasted 
approximately one hour each. All interviews were conducted individually with only the 
informant and interviewers present. The interviews were recorded and transcribed. 
In this project, the interview guides were semi-structured (Kvale, 1996), which implies 
that they contained open-ended questions that allowed the informants to talk freely about 
different aspects of how they worked within the project. The interviews were divided into 
different topics, including general questions concerning work processes, safety concerns 
during the process, and the perceptions of end users. Examples of questions were: How did 
you consider safety when you were developing the new technology? Which analyses were 
performed in relation to safety? Did ISO standards apply for these types of projects? How 
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well did you feel you understood the workday of a driller? What worked well in the 
development process, and what would you like to have changed?  
2.3 Analysis 
Grounded theory was used to analyse the data. Grounded theory is an inductive 
qualitative method of analysis that consists of open, axial, and selective coding. Open coding 
refers to breaking down the raw data to compare and conceptualize the data into categories. 
Axial coding is the process of categorizing the data broken down during open coding and 
making connections between the categories. Selective coding, the final step, involves 
comparing the categories and selecting the central phenomenon, referred to as the core 
category (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). By using the guidelines of Strauss and Corbin (1990), the 
underlying philosophy of science is post-positivistic and the ontology is objectivistic. By this 
is meant that one indicates an objective reality that is ready to be discovered, explored, and 
understood. It further implies that there is a stable underlying structure waiting to be revealed 
for the scientist examining it and an ontological point of view where the existence of an 
objective reality is prominent. Because grounded theory is not a linear process, data collection 
and analysis took place simultaneously.  
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2.3.1 The coding process. The process of coding the data using the principles of 
Strauss and Corbin (1990) commenced with the open coding of the first interviews. This 
means that conceptual labels were placed on small parts of the interview to break down the 
data for examination and comparison. Consequently, these labels were placed on smaller 
parts, sometimes nothing more than a sentence per label. The next step was axial coding, 
which involves grouping the labels in categories. In other words, data were first broken down 
to smaller parts and then gathered into categories at a higher level of abstraction. This process 
was not linear, and results from open and axial coding were beneficial for interviews to come. 
When all interviews were completed and coded, the last step, selective coding, took place. 
Selective coding is not much different to axial coding, apart from occupying a higher 
abstraction level of analysis. This process involves finding the core category into which the 
central phenomenon of the categories is integrated. Another important aspect of grounded 
theory is saturation. In this study, saturation is questionable due to the number of interviews 
conducted. Nevertheless, based on the seven interviews, we argue that we have satisfactory 
saturation, as we did not receive additional or new relevant information as the interview 
process continued. During the entire process, memos were written to record initial and mature 
ideas regarding the formulation of theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). 
3.0 Results  
In this section, the context will be presented before the results are presented as 
categories. Further, the categories are visualized as a model (see Figure 2).  
3.1 Context  
To provide insight into the situational factors within the current study, information 
about the context of the informants is presented. The context includes two categories: the 
technology and the organizational and work environments of the project group and the 
engineer development team.  
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3.1.1 The technology. This particular technology was a modification of earlier 
manually driven technology, which was automated and developed to reach previously 
undrillable areas. Because this was to be used in mature areas, it also meant that it would be 
used in more risky operations. In addition, since this was a new way of drilling, it meant a 
shift in cognition, routines, and procedures for the operators and crewmembers in comparison 
to using conventional drilling techniques. 
3.1.2 The organizational and work environments for the project group and the 
engineer development team. We interviewed people from two teams, namely the principal 
project group and the engineer development team, who both were represented by several 
companies cooperating in the development process (see Figure 1). The project group 
originally consisted of representatives from the customer (the operator company), the main 
contractor, the main subcontractor, the company that employed the drilling crew on the 
offshore installation for the implementation, and a consultancy company. The project group 
had the principal responsibility for the rather complex project and changed some of the 
members during the development and implementation process based on whom they 
considered necessary members of the group. The engineer development team was the team 
developing a model for planning drilling operations based on real-time data and a model for 
the interface of the screen for the drillers. This team included representatives from the 
customer (the operator company), main contractor, and main subcontractor. The members of 
the engineer development team frequently met during the development phase of this new 
product, and during these meetings, they discussed the development of the design, presented 
progress reports, and performed risk analyses. In addition, other subcontractors were 
responsible for different components of the technology; however, we focused only on this 
main subcontractor. The project group made the principal decisions and worked closely with 
the engineer development team. When either of the teams felt it necessary, experts in different 
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areas were brought in to contribute to, for example, HAZOP ([hazard and operability study]; 
Stanton et al., 2013), HAZID ([hazard identification study]; McCoy et al., 1999), FMECA 
([failure mode effects and criticality analysis]; Stanton et al., 2013), and peer reviews for risk 
analyses. The only human factors issues that were analysed were pertained to physical 
hindrances such as noise, lighting, walkways, and training staff on new restrictions due to new 
equipment in the area where they would usually work. No analyses, neither human factors nor 
human reliability analyses, were conducted that were directly associated with operating the 
new technology.  
Apart from these meetings, the engineers in the engineer development team worked 
independently. More than one person from each of the three companies was part of this team; 
thus, the engineers held internal meetings within each company. However, these team 
members did not always work in the same location, despite working for the same company. 
Therefore, some of the engineers were not in the same area as others working on the same 
project daily, which contributed to interaction complexity, and they had to either travel by 
plane for meetings or conduct meetings via video conference. In addition, the main 
subcontractor extensively cooperated with a company located on another continent on the 
model they delivered on this project. Thus, informants stated that geographical distance and 
time difference could occasionally be an obstacle to optimal cooperation due to interaction 
complexity. Moreover, several of the engineer designers did not work solely on this project 
but also had other tasks to work on in their everyday work. As one informant sated, “I did 
work on other projects as well, so it could be a challenge to keep up the continuity on this 
project”. Consequently, work task complexity could make it occasionally challenging to 
remain diligent and focused.  
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3.2 The Categories Identified in the Study 
The core category identified in this study was Insufficient Human Factor Analyses 
Were Performed. Additionally, two main categories were found: Insufficient Information 
Coordination and Narrow Focus in Different Phases of the Project. The results further 
include three outcome categories: Extensive Costs, Low User Friendliness, and Insufficient 
Knowledge on Safe Usage and Potential Risk of the Technology by End Users. Figure 2 
shows the categories and how they are linked.  
The model represents the results of the grounded theory analysis. The subcategories 
appear in the bottom line, which represents the most concrete level of the data denoted in the 
categories. The next level in the model is an abstraction of categorization represented by the 
two main categories. The highest level of abstraction in the model is the core category. At the 
top level, three outcome variables of the process on a more concrete level are presented.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Next, the categories will be explained with quotes. First, our two main categories are 
presented with the subcategories integrated in italics, followed by the presentation of the core 
category and outcome variables.  
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3.2.1 Insufficient information coordination. This category represents a gap in 
information that probably is needed for an optimal development process versus information 
that was received and given. In other words, we found the information coordination within 
and between the teams had shortcomings that might have affected the product. One 
participant commented, “There was no guidelines on that [user friendliness], apart from being 
commercial and user friendly”. This indicates insufficient requirement specification on user 
friendliness regarding the order of the product from the customer to the main subcontractor. 
However, this did not seem to affect the perception of the information received and given in a 
negative way. For instance, the subcontractor was pleased with the information received from 
the customer regarding this development process because all the information that was asked 
for was received. As one informant stated, “We just talked to either [the customer company] 
or [the main contractor company] and, for the most part, we had easy access to information”.  
According to informants, cooperation was good but not without reproach. Comments 
such as, “It was special. It was different, taking into consideration that we are not a company 
that primarily does product development, and this was quite a challenge” indicate that the 
main subcontractor was inexperienced on commercial product development. This 
inexperience seems to have negatively affected information coordination during the process of 
developing the automated technology.  
Another aspect that influenced information coordination in an undesirable manner was 
a lack of contextual understanding. Informants were asked whether they wished they had 
known offshore work conditions before they began developing the products. The answer, 
“Yes, it would probably have been a considerable shorter way to reach the objectives”, 
indicates that they could not envision the offshore working conditions, which could have 
contributed to scarcity. Although cooperation was viewed as creditable, whether the 
inexperience regarding offshore working conditions resulted in insufficient information 
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coordination was questionable. As one informant from the main subcontractor stated, “They 
[the customer company] did not know what information we needed, so we just made a list and 
they did their best to give us that information”. It is therefore possible that developers did not 
ask for important information.  
Another part of the subcategory lack of contextual understanding refers to an inability 
to understand who the end users were. When asked the questions, “How did you work 
according to the end user while developing the technology? Did you have in depth 
understanding of the drillers’ work situation at that time?” one informant answered, “In the 
first phase, prior to actual drilling, we knew little of that”. This indicates that the engineers 
developing the new technology knew little of the working conditions of the end users and of 
who the end users were prior to implementation and actual offshore testing of the product. 
Furthermore, in the project documents, the end users were designated mainly as the operators 
from the contractor company and partly the drillers. In addition, those who required 
knowledge about the technology, such as the tool pusher and the drilling supervisor from the 
operator company on the offshore installation, were mentioned. Informants further 
emphasized that all parties involved were included in the process from early stages, with one 
informant indicating, “In the design process, I think the involvement of all parties from the 
beginning was essential”. However, the remaining drilling crewmembers were not viewed as 
end users of this technology according to the informants and project documents. The end 
users, as we interpreted them, could be divided into three different groups: the drillers, the 
drilling crew, and the operators from the main contractor company (Sætren & Laumann, 
2015a), all of whom worked offshore in the drilling segment.  
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3.2.2. Narrow focus in different phases of the project. This category represents a 
gap between the optimal focus on human and technological issues in the development 
process. The focus was narrow in the sense that it was based mainly on technological safety. 
For example, statements such as, “I think the fact that we followed a pretty stringent design 
program and carried out checks along the way in terms of FMECAs and testing in terms of 
qualification testing was important” indicate that the technical factors were thoroughly 
reviewed by executing a broad range of tests to ensure technical reliability of the final 
product. However, statements such as, “I do not know which barriers were made to prevent 
human error” indicates that the end user was not considered to the same degree.  
The aspect within the subcategory lack of contextual understanding is, in this regard, 
the insufficient understanding of who the end users were. This influenced a narrow focus on 
the human aspect of the development process. In reports regarding the technology, the 
operators of the main contractors and the drillers were viewed as end users of the technology. 
This was reflected in the training provided for the end users as well. The training provided for 
the regular offshore staff was a 3-day course for the drillers and tool pushers in a simulator 
that was similar to the real-life equipment but not completely authentic. The remaining crew 
had a 2-day introductory seminar with classroom training on how to rig the equipment. Both 
the 3-day course and the 2-day seminar were conducted several months before the actual 
drilling took place.  
The subcategory focus on technical safety was interpreted as a shared understanding 
within both teams that the technical aspects were important and that members of both teams 
were highly competent regarding this. Nevertheless, an overly narrow focus on technical 
safety can lead to insufficient regard for human factors and human reliability.  
For example,  
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Q: “Human error can occur. Do you take that into consideration when you develop a 
product?” A: “In a way I can say no, in the sense that we are focusing very much on the 
technical and doing things accurately”.  
Similarly, 
Q: “Did those composing the HAZOP have human factors skills?”  
A: “If they had what?”  
Nonetheless, to some degree, the focus indeed was on end users, and informants emphasized 
that end users were included in all phases of the development process. For instance, when an 
early technical safety workshop was completed, it included, among others, a driller and 
project members from the customer and the main contractor. The main subcontractor, 
however, was not included in this workshop. Informants emphasized that human factor 
aspects and access issues, such as noise, lighting, walkways, and training staff on new 
restrictions due to new equipment in the area where they would usually work, were included 
in the development process, yet these matters only pertained to physical hindrances. One 
informant stated, “… there were human issues like additional noise, additional lighting, 
walkways, access, education to people, perhaps not directly associated with the operation, but, 
you know, [when] there is new equipment in an area, there may be restrictions in that area”. 
Elements such as user analysis, task analysis, interface analysis, and human error 
identification analysis were not mentioned as a part of these considerations. Another aspect of 
user participation, according to informants, was that drillers and tool pushers were included in 
procedure making. As one informant said, “You could say that the procedures we use today 
have the stamp of the end users on them”.  
The informants’ understanding of “automation only leads to less human error” was 
evident in several statements: “I think we designed this system so that there were enough 
safeguards within the system that the automation would compensate for the mistakes made by 
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the operators” and “The technology is not idiot proof […] it can never be fully automated”. 
We interpreted this as having influenced developers’ narrow focus in different phases of the 
project in the sense that it diminished the human error aspect.  
3.2.3 Core category: Insufficient human factor analyses were performed. The core 
category represents the project group’s and the engineer development team’s insufficient 
understanding of the need for human factor analyses during the design process. Based on the 
two main categories and the subcategories, we found that the principal phenomenon 
integrating the categories was an insufficient analysis process in the project.  
3.2.4 Outcome variables. In the following subsections, the three outcome variables—
extensive costs, low user friendliness, and insufficient knowledge on safe usage and potential 
risks of the technology by end users—are presented and discussed.  
Extensive costs. Costs increase significantly for each phase in a development process. 
Thus, costs for changes made in the build phase or the operation phase are considerably 
higher compared to those for changes made during the analysis or design phase (Johnsen et 
al., 2008; McLeod, 2015; Rouse & Boff, 2006). In the current study, we found that changes to 
address errors and low user friendliness had to be made after the technology had been in 
operation. This probably resulted in significantly higher costs than if these elements had been 
discovered in earlier phases.  
Low user friendliness. The informants did not consider the interface of the screen for 
the drillers user friendly, stating, for example, “In the new model [for the interface for the 
drillers] the user friendliness is very poor”. The engineers had not designed the screen’s 
interface intuitively from the drillers’ perspective. For instance, the users did not receive a 
warning signal if the input was not according to normal actions, and the model that the 
technology was based upon could not respond if users input data the wrong way. Furthermore, 
end users who did not comprehend advanced hydraulic models challenged designers. As one 
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informant said, “Some of the challenges were that we who work with [developing] this know 
it well, but when you train other operators with lower education they have other premises on 
how to use it and understand what is correct use and what is wrong use of the technology”. 
Although the developers had worked to create the technology for such a long period, they 
stated that it was difficult for them to comprehend what kind of information the end users 
needed in the final product. They further stated that it was difficult for them to understand 
how the information should be presented to allow the end users to comprehend the correct 
usage of the technology. The engineer development team’s members stated that they did not 
fully understand other people’s situations compared to their own: “In a way we are in a 
bubble and can’t imagine how the world looks from others’ perspectives”. In addition, in 
replying to questions concerning in which stage they focused on user friendliness, one 
informant said, “If I were to do it again, we would have had a much higher focus on user 
friendliness earlier [in the process]”. In other words, it seems the project could have benefitted 
from a significantly greater focus on user friendliness in an earlier phase. 
Insufficient knowledge on safe usage and potential risk of the technology by end users. 
The focus was mainly on the competence of the operators from the contractor company, who 
were viewed as “superior users”, according to documentation generated during the 
development process. Superior users from the contractor company were either highly 
educated engineers or especially talented staff members who were well trained in using this 
technology. The drillers did receive some training during the 3-day introduction course, yet 
we found this simulator training insufficient regarding the outcome of the process. Moreover, 
the remaining crewmembers also were affected directly by this technology and, hence, should 
have had sufficient training, as pointed out by one informant: “You need the whole crew in 
the mode of [the new technology], so in future projects we will include the crew in training 
and have training closer to the actual operation”. Furthermore, informants stated that errors 
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made by drillers and the remaining crewmembers led to unwanted incidents when the new 
technology was in use: “… then the driller made a mistake […] but it was because he was not 
thinking in the mode of [the new technology]. He was thinking conventional”. The incidents 
that occurred could potentially have led to losing the well. The reason they occurred was 
because the equipment was handled as if conventional drilling were in operation, which was 
the normal drilling operation for the drilling crew. If conventional drilling had been in 
operation, their actions would have been correct, but, with the new technology, operators had 
to significantly change their cognition and, occasionally, opposite actions were correct. This 
was also applicable for the remaining crew, as exemplified by one informant’s statement: 
“Another example is a bloke from the crew who opened a valve that resulted in shutting down 
the system. We could have lost the well”. Insufficient technical knowledge could be a safety 
hazard, and it has been found to be a leading cause of accidents (Department of 
Transportation, 1995).  
4.0 Discussion 
It is a rather well known fact that human performance plays an important role in 
managing the risk of major accidents in complex systems (Rasmussen, 1997; Reason, 1990). 
Thus, a poor design might have a disastrous outcome if end users do not comprehend the tasks 
they are expected to perform or the complexity of the technology (Lee, 2004). This is viewed 
as such an important aspect today that the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) 
requires installations, systems, and equipment to be designed in a way that limits the 
possibility of human error (PSA, 2011).  
In this study, we explored the process of developing technology that automates tasks 
end users previously handled manually. We posed the research question: How is safety 
through human factors and human reliability ensured during a development process of 
automated technology in a high-risk industry?  
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The findings, presented in Figure 2, indicate five subcategories, two main categories, 
and one core category in addition to three outcome categories. Insufficient requirement 
specification on user friendliness illustrates how information coordination could have 
benefitted from a focus on clarifying which information was needed in specific phases to 
obtain a more optimal result. The subcontractor could have asked, for instance, for additional 
specifications regarding user friendliness. Yet, due to inexperience on commercial product 
development and lack of contextual understanding regarding offshore working conditions, the 
developers might not have regarded this as important. What one does not know, one cannot 
possibly ask for. However, after the technology was implemented, other crew members made 
active errors that could have resulted in losing the well due to insufficient understanding of 
the new technology (Reason, 1990). This could be a result of the complexity of the project, 
where the design solutions did not adequately allow for different competencies amongst the 
end users (Gordon, 1996; Milch & Laumann, 2016; Rasmussen, 1991; Sneddon, Mearns, & 
Flin, 2013).  
If the customer had considered what information the subcontractor needed and the 
main subcontractor had performed better when stating that there was more they needed to 
know, information coordination could have improved. Such information could have been 
revealed through human factors analyses. For example, human factors analyses, such as end 
user analysis, could have provided a more specific understanding of the degree of intuitivity 
required for optimal user friendliness based on who the end users were (Wickens et al., 2004). 
This again could have led the end users to operate the technology in a safer way. Further, 
informants stated that some of the errors made by the crewmembers who were not defined as 
end users in the project documents should have been detected previously by the designers in 
the design phase as possible occurrences. Thus, the product could have been designed so that 
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crewmembers’ errors, such as inputting data the wrong way or the incorrect opening or 
closing of valves during critical operations, were impossible to make. 
In addition, if the documented end users attended only the first technical workshop, 
optimizing a user-friendly screen could have been challenging because the main subcontractor 
who was designing the screen for the drillers and the main subcontractor were not present at 
this workshop. Hence, they did not meet and could not exchange information at an early stage 
of the development process, which could have benefitted the contextual understanding for the 
development engineers. Furthermore, if procedure making was the other aspect in which the 
drillers were included, it could be viewed as a shortcoming, as the procedures were made after 
the product was completed and, thus, the drillers were then unable to comment on the user 
friendliness of the product they were to operate before it was finalized. This potentially could 
have been solved by using interface analyses during the process (Stanton et al., 2013) 
However, the project group members perceived that they were including end users at optimal 
phases for appropriate aspects. The project group seemed to be content with focusing on 
human issues, which might indicate why human factor and human reliability analyses were 
insufficient. If the team members were content, they would not have recognized the need for 
more in-depth analyses.  
Regarding “a narrow focus in different phases of the project”, we identified two 
important aspects. First, we found a lack of contextual understanding, as crewmembers were 
not considered end users. Thus, the focus was not on the remaining crew, that is, those apart 
from drillers and assistant drillers, in the development phase. Due to this, it was probably 
nearly impossible for the engineers to contemplate an unidentified element when developing 
the product (Schröder-Hinrichs, Hollnagel, & Baldauf, 2012; Simons & Chabris, 1999). They 
simply could not consider the possibility of this error before it occurred because the focus was 
on technological reliability, a focus that traditionally has been the most common in the 
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offshore industry (Gordon, 1997; Gould et al., 2012; Jærnes et al., 2005; Skogdalen & 
Vinnem, 2011). With human error identification analysis (Stanton et al., 2013), task analysis 
(Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992), and user analysis (Wickens et al., 2004), an element like this 
could have been avoided by training the crew, and the engineer developing the technology 
might have discovered the possibility of that error occurring and taken action to prevent it.  
The second aspect concerns the strong focus on technology and limited focus on the 
end users. This is in relation to how the technology developers viewed the development 
process and which problems were important to solve. As Wilpert (2005) states, design could 
be viewed as a process of adequate problem solving because the goal of the process is to 
match the designer’s mental model of the design object with the mental model of the future 
user and his or her requirements and competencies. Human factors analyses are, to a high 
degree, tools to promote this kind of problem solving. Nevertheless, if the engineers focused 
only on technical safety in problem solving when developing this technology, this aspect 
would not be regarded important. For example, if human factor analyses and human reliability 
analyses had been conducted in accordance with ISO 11064-1 (ISO 11064-1, 2000) by human 
factors and human reliability specialists in an early phase, such knowledge could have 
resulted in comprehension of which information was needed at which stages of the 
development process to optimize the outcome. They could have revealed the identity of the 
end users (Wickens et al., 2004), whose requirements and competencies could then have been 
considered (Wilpert, 2005).  
In the current study, the developers had a general comprehension that automation leads 
only to less human error. However, when new automated technology is introduced, human 
errors tend to move to other areas (Lee, 2004), as happened in this case, too, for instance, 
when a crewmember opened the wrong valve at the wrong time. If conventional drilling had 
been used, the opening of this valve at this point would have been a correct action. This 
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illustrates that errors can occur when people lack the training to understand the automation 
and the technology in general (Reason, 1990). If a user analysis (Wickens et al., 2004) had 
been conducted in an early phase of the development process, it could have revealed that the 
end users included the remaining crewmembers. Thus, a more optimal focus on who the end 
users were and what tasks they perform could have resulted in a focus on the end users’ 
training to avoid mishaps due to not fully comprehending how the technology works. This 
rather common understanding that automation leads to less human error (Lee, 2004) might 
have influenced the perception that human error could not occur, which, again, could be 
viewed as a safety hazard. Only the drillers and assistant drillers received training that moved 
beyond an introduction on how to rig the new equipment. Informants explained that this was 
because there was less for the crewmembers to do during operations when the tasks were 
automated. It seems as though the tasks performed by the driller and the drilling crew was not 
considered when developing the new automated technology. The new tasks and need for 
training could have been revealed with a task analysis (Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992) and a 
training analysis (Salas et al., 2006).  
4.1 Reasons for Failure to Conduct Adequate Human Factors Analyses 
In the current study, we argue that the outcomes of extensive costs, low user 
friendliness, and insufficient knowledge of safe usage and potential risks of the technology by 
end users, could have been reduced with the use of sufficient human factors and human 
reliability analyses during the development process. Analyses such as user analysis (Wickens 
et al., 2004), task analysis (Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992), interface analysis, human error 
identification analysis (Stanton et al., 2013), and training analysis (Salas et al., 2006) could 
have facilitated better information coordination and brought a broad focus to the different 
phases of the project to enhance the possibility of a more successful outcome (PSA, 2011). 
Similarly, time, effort, and expense could have been saved through early intervention instead 
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of redesigning the systems (Stanton et al., 2013). Therefore, it seems that the project team’s 
knowledge of the analyses that should have been conducted, at what stages they should have 
been done, and the best way to perform the different analyses has potential for improvement. 
Several standards recommend conducting such analyses (e.g., ISO 11064-1, 2000; ISO 6385, 
2004; NORSOK S-002, 2004; NS-EN 6140-2, 2008); thus, the question is, why were these 
analyses not performed? We believe that multiple elements affected this outcome.  
1) Failure to perform these analyses was connected to the strong focus on technical 
safety and, therefore, a narrow focus on different phases of the project. From a historical 
perspective, this is in accordance with the fact that risk analyses has been used almost 
exclusively on technical systems in the petroleum industry, with little attention paid to human 
factors (Skogdalen & Vinnem, 2011; Vinnem: 1998).  
2) The results indicate that there was an assumption that all possible technical events 
had been anticipated and addressed, contributing to a false sense of security (Trimpop, 1994). 
This could be seen in connection with high reliability organizations (HRO) (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2015) where a non-questioning culture is viewed as a safety hazard. This could be 
the case with the project group and the development team as well as the crew and 
management, who were found to have a non-questioning culture (Sætren & Laumann, 2015a). 
Again, this seems to be related to two aspects: First, it could be due to an overly homogeneous 
group, which safety theories strongly advice against (Dekker, 2011; Rasmussen, 1997; Weick 
& Sutcliffe, 2015). This is not recommended because not viewing aspects from several angles 
might contribute to important information being overlooked, which is considered a hazard. 
Second, it could be related to the inexperience of the subcontractors designing the screen, who 
believed they had received sufficient information yet were found not to have done so. When 
people perceive that others have control, they could become deferent, which relates to trusting 
others to have taken care of an issue and hence not thinking of asking questions about it 
  30 
 
(Sætren & Laumann, 2015a). This type of deference is a warning sign in safety theories such 
as HRO (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015).  
3) The acceptance of technology among end users could affect the completion of 
human factors analyses. Throughout the development process, the end users indicated that 
they were happy to be a part of this new technological development (Sætren & Laumann, 
2015a). This, however, could be seen in connection to willingness to change, which is the 
optimal factor to consider, according to several change theories (Armenakis & Harris, 2009; 
Cummings & Worley, 2015; Kotter, 1996). In general, change management theories are based 
on making people willing to change and on avoiding resistance (Sætren & Laumann, 2015b). 
Because these are the theories taught in management education, it is a widespread idea within 
change processes in organizations and management (Ghoshal, 2005), yet this may promote a 
non-questioning culture. In addition, the assumption that willingness and acceptance are the 
optimal solution might prevent scepticism because it is interpreted as resistance to change. 
Nevertheless, although it initially could seem cost beneficial to have people accepting the 
technology without question, this could result in increased costs, as in this case. Therefore, it 
could be seen in connection with the competing goals of cost and safety within a high-risk 
industry (Rasmussen, 1997).  
4) The complexity of the project may have contributed to the failure to conduct human 
factors analyses. Interorganizational complexity has the potential to lead to 
misunderstandings, deference, and accidents (Milch & Laumann, 2016). Little attention has 
been dedicated to this aspect in the oil- and gas sector until recently (Jærnes et al., 2005), yet 
several of the findings in this project seem to stem from problems related to 
interorganizational complexity. 
5) Finally, standards could affect the completion of human factors analyses. It is 
possible that the project group did not comprehend the importance of proper human factors 
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analyses despite being aware of the standards. It must be pointed out that some of these 
regulations and standards were updated after the development phase of this particular 
technology. Nevertheless, the NORSOK standard S-002 (2004), for example, indicates that 
design shall be based on task analyses of function and that during project development 
analysis should be performed to ensure the potential for human error is minimized. However, 
neither the facilities regulations nor NORSOK standard S-002 provide thorough guidelines on 
which analyses should be conducted at which stages of a design project or how to perform the 
analyses. According to the facilities regulations,  
During design […] an analysis should be conducted of the human-machine interface, 
including necessary task and function analyses. The standards NORSOK S002 
Chapter 4.4.5 and NS-EN 6140 Part 2 should be used for such analyses. The NS-EN 
ISO 11064 standard should be used for design of the central control room. NORSOK 
S002 Chapter 5.2.2 should be used for requirements regarding human-machine 
interfaces (PSA, 2011 p. 24). 
In addition, the regulations state that during design, there should be a focus on human factors 
and human reliability. Furthermore, in terms of the facilities regulations (PSA, 2011), 
NORSOK S-002 (2004), and the NS-EN 6140-2 (2008), task analyses should be conducted, 
but none offers comprehensive details on how to do so or what outcome information such 
analyses should bring. Thus, we maintain that guidelines could benefit from more definite 
information about which analyses should be conducted in which phases of a technological 
development project and how the analyses should be performed. Today, several standards aim 
to reduce the risk of human error, yet recommendations for systematic approaches assessing 
these issues seem to be lacking (Demichaela, et al., 2014; Leva, Nagdahli, & Ciarapica 
Alunni, 2015). It could be argued that quality analyses assurance without requirements for 
how to perform the analyses, or what outcome they should have, has a limited function. One 
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can observe that something is analysed, but the quality of the outcome of the analyses is 
possibly unclear. 
Including a human factors specialist from the outset could have promoted a broader 
focus on safety. The project group’s and the engineer development team’s homogenous, 
superior competence involving technical aspects contributed to a lack of understanding of the 
need for sufficient analyses of end user requirements of the tasks that would be affected by 
the new technology. The decisions made by the development group in the development phase 
that affected the outcome, resulting in an evacuation of the platform, thus could be viewed as 
latent errors (Reason, 1990).  
4.2 Validity 
Validity is an important aspect of the discussion in a qualitative study (Elliott, Fischer, 
& Rennie, 1999; Kvale, 1996; Meyrick, 2006; Morrow; 2005; Yardley, 2000). In the current 
study, factors that could influence the validity of the results, such as the interviews being 
conducted retrospectively, could result in biased data. Conducting interviews in retrospect 
could affect the results due to the subject’s memory adjustment. Nevertheless, the theme was 
relevant to the informants, as they still worked on the same project or in the same company 
with similar projects. Two of the inquired interviewees were not able to participate in the 
study. 
Furthermore, one can never be certain whether the informants were honest or if they 
were saying what they thought the scientist was interested in hearing. This phenomenon could 
apply in the current study, too. However, after following this process for 4 years, conducting 
more than 40 interviews, observing the implementation process prior to, during, and after 
implementation, both onshore and offshore, and interviewing the crew and project members 
after the evacuation upon using the technology, we interpret the answers as trustworthy. 
Collecting the data by following informants over a longer period is said to enhance credibility 
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in qualitative research due to elements such as being able to focus on the most important 
issues from several angles, meeting different stakeholders, and obtaining an in-depth 
understanding of the industry and issues researched (Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Morrow, 2005).  
Moreover, detailed descriptions are provided to ensure the context is transparent for 
the reader, which is beneficial for validity (Elliott et al., 1999; Meyrick, 2006; Yardley, 2000). 
Transparency is important for both the research context as well as the scientific context 
(Elliott et al., 1999; Meyrick, 2006; Yardley, 2000). Thus, we have provided a theoretical 
context in the introduction in addition to a philosophical context in the method section. 
Nevertheless, one could question the trustworthiness of the study due to the lack of detailed 
description of the technology developed. However, it could be argued that it is the process of 
technology development and how human factors analyses were included, or not included, in 
this process that is studied rather than a particular technological development. Similarly, 
whether the results from this study are transferable to other technological development 
processes or are specific to this particular technology can be questioned. Because the results 
are based on both existing literature regarding the topic and the current longitudinal data, we 
argue that the results can be transferred to technological development processes in a broader 
spectrum.  
The guidelines of Strauss and Corbin (1990) assume an objective external reality, 
according to the post-positivistic position they hold. Hence, the current study aimed to give 
the informants a voice and to represent them as accurately as possible (Corbin & Strauss, 
2008).  
4.3 Implications and Further Research 
Based on the findings of this study, several implications could help to create a safer 
technological change process in high-risk industries on a practical basis, as it provides 
explanations of how human factors analyses potentially could prevent unwanted outcomes. In 
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addition, it could be argued that knowledge of human factors and the benefit of a questioning 
culture in high-risk industries could be included in the education of engineers and managers. 
Furthermore, regarding scientific implications, this work has provided results that substantiate 
previous results on insufficient human factors analyses and its potential effects on safety. It 
also provides information on factors that contributed to why there were insufficient human 
factors analyses in a technological development process.  
As a result, future research could address 1) the beneficial aspects of change 
management theories used in change processes in high-risk industries where safety is of 
importance or 2) whether projects that include human factors analyses are safer, which could 
further improve the theme of safety, human factors, and high-risk industries. Additionally, it 
would be interesting to conduct scientific research based on successful technological change 
processes to gain a greater understanding of success factors.  
Conclusion 
In the study of Sætren and Laumann (2015a), the end users trusted the developers to 
have an in-depth understanding of their work conditions and their competence level. This 
study shows, however, that this was not the case in the project investigated. In fact, 
developers seemed to have had little understanding of who the end users were prior to 
implementation and testing of the technology.  
The reason for this was found to be that insufficient human factors and human 
reliability analyses were conducted during the development phase. Insufficient information 
coordination was one category found to contribute to insufficient analyses. In addition, 
narrow focus in different phases of the project, such as a strong focus on technical safety, 
seemed to be a contributing cause of inadequate human factors analyses. This lack of analyses 
resulted in extensive costs, low user friendliness, and insufficient knowledge on safe usage 
and potential risk of the technology by end users. 
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Based on the results of this study, we argue that performing human factors analyses 
throughout such a development project would benefit the project because it potentially 
prevents the development of cultural aspects such as non-questioning (see Sætren & 
Laumann, 2015a), which is regarded a safety hazard in high-risk organizations (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007). Moreover, we argue that technological design projects would benefit from 
including human factors experts in the project group from the beginning of the project, as 
human factors analyses potentially bridge the gaps between not knowing if important 
information is missing and sufficient information on which to base decisions. 
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